













ecentralised public management continues to
invite controversy and debate. Proponents of
decentralisation consider it a panacea for reforming
public sector in developing countries (Shah,1994,
1998) whereas opponents consider it as a road to
wrecks and ruins (Tanzi, 1995).These disagreements
primarily arise from perspectives on the potential
impact of such policies in the institutional environ-
ment of developing countries. Regrettably, the liter-
ature provides little guidance to inform this debate.
This note is intended to fill a critical gap in this liter-
ature by providing a synthesis of the empirical liter-
ature on the impact of decentralisation. The paper
reviews the empirical literature on the impact of
decentralisations and provides a summary of the
conclusions on its impacts on service delivery, cor-
ruption, fiscal management and growth
Service delivery
A number of recent studies have explored the impact
of decentralisation in various countries.In the follow-
ing paragraphs, we have grouped these studies by
their results – positive, negative and inconclusive.
Positive impacts
Alderman (1998) found that decentralisation had a
positive impact on targeting of social assistance in
Albania. Bardhan and Mookherjee (2003) similarly
find that decentralised management advanced
poverty alleviation goals in West Bengal, India.The
same results were confirmed by Galasso and
Ravallion (2001) for Bangladesh.Habibi et al (2001)
studied the impact of devolution on social sector
outcomes in Argentina for the period 1970-94 and
concluded that fiscal decentralisation had a positive
impact on delivery of education and health services
as well as reducing intra-regional disparities.
Eskeland and Filmer (2002) using a cross section
data from Argentine schools also found that decen-
tralisation of education led to improvement in
school achievement scores.Faguet (2001) also found
that decentralisation in Bolivia helped improve con-
sistency of public services with local preferences
and quality and access of social services. Foster and
Rosenzweig (2001) concluded that in India democ-
ratic decentralisation led to improved allocation for
pro-poor local services. Santos (1998) discovered
the same effect in Porto Alegre, Brazil with partici-
patory budgeting. Isham and Kahkonen (1999)
observed improvements in water services in Central
Java, Indonesia with local community management.
King and Ozler (1998) observed that decentralised
management of schools led to improvement in
achievement scores in Nicaragua.Estache and Sinha
(1995) using data on a cross-section of industrial
and developing countries found that decentralisa-
tion leads to increased spending on public infra-
structure. Huther and Shah (1996) and Enikolopov
and Zhuravskaya (2003) using cross-section and
time series data for a large number of countries find
that decentralisation contributed to improved
delivery of public goods provision.
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Negative impacts
Ravallion (1998) found that in Argentina, poorer
provinces were less successful in favor of their
poor areas and decentralisation generated substan-
tial inequality in public spending in poor areas.
Azfar and Livingston (2002) did not find any posi-
tive impacts of decentralisation on efficiency and
equity of local public service provision in Uganda.
West and Wong (1995) found that in rural China,
decentralisation resulted in lower level of public
services in poorer regions.
Inconclusive impacts
Several studies observed mixed or inconclusive
impacts of decentralisation. Azfar et al. (2000) for
Philippines and Uganda,concluded that while local
governments do appear to be aware of local pref-
erences, their response is often inadequate as they
are hamstrung by procedural, financing and gover-
nance constraints.Khaleghian (2003) using data for
140 countries found that while decentralisation
improved the coverage of immunisation in low
income countries, opposite results were obtained
for middle income countries. Winkler and Rounds
(1996) reviewed Chile’s experience with education
decentralisation and concluded that it resulted in
improvement in efficiency of provision but also
experienced decline in score on cognitive tests.
Corruption
Positive impacts
A number of studies provide support for the positive
influence of decentralisation in controlling corrup-
tion. Crook and Manor (2000) examined the process
of political decentralisation in India (Karnatka
state), Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana and
found that decentralisation led to enhanced trans-
parency and reduced incidence of corruption. They
conclude that decentralisation reduces grand theft
but increases petty corruption in the short run but in
the long run, both may go down. Fiszbein (1997)
based upon a review of political decentralisation in
Colombia concluded that competition for political
office opened the door for responsible and innova-
tive leadership that in turn became the driving force
behind capacity building, improved service delivery
and reduced corruption at the local level. Kuncoro
(2000) found that in Indonesia, administrative
decentralisation led to lower corruption as firms
relocated to areas with lower bribes.
Wade (1997) found that over-centralised top-down
management accompanied by weak communica-
tions and monitoring system contributed to cor-
ruption and poor delivery performance for canal
irrigation in India. Huther and Shah (1998) using
international cross-section and time series data
found that fiscal decentralisation was associated
with enhanced quality of governance as measured
by citizen participation, political and bureaucratic
accountability, social justice, improved economic
management and reduced corruption. Arikan
(2000) reconfirms the same result. De Mello and
Barenstein (2001) based upon cross-country data
concluded that tax decentralisation was positively
associated with improved quality of governance.
Fisman and Gatti ( 1999) found a negative relation
between fiscal decentralisation and corruption.
Gurgur and Shah (2002) identify major drivers of
corruption in order to isolate the effect of decen-
tralisation.In a sample of industrial and non-indus-
trial countries, lack of service orientation in the
public sector, weak democratic institutions, eco-
nomic isolation (closed economy), colonial past,
internal bureaucratic controls and centralised deci-
sion making are identified as the major causes of
corruption. For a non-industrial countries sample,
drivers for corruption are lack of service orienta-
tion in the public sector, weak democratic institu-
tions and closed economy. Decentralisation led to
a greater reduction in the incidence of corruption
in unitary countries than in federal countries.They
concluded that decentralisation was confirmed
here to support greater accountability in the public
sector and reduced corruption.
Negative impacts
Triesman (2000) from analysis of cross-country
data concluded that decentralised countries have
higher perceived corruption and poorer service
delivery performance in public health services.
Macro management and fiscal discipline
There is scant empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between decentralisation and macroeconomic
management. Shah (1998) found that decen-
tralised fiscal system had a better record in con-trolling inflation and deficits and debts.These results
were later confirmed by King and Ma (2001).Huther
and Shah (1998) using a sample of 85 countries
found positive association between fiscal decentrali-
sation and macroeconomic management. De Mello
(2000), on the contrary, using a smaller sample of 30
countries, found that coordination failures in inter-
governmental relations were likely to result in a
deficit bias in decentralised policy making.
Economic growth
Positive Impacts
Several studies found a positive impact of decen-
tralisation on growth. Akai and Sakata (2002)
using state level data for the USA concluded that
fiscal decentralisation contributed positively to the
US growth.These results are further confirmed by
Akai, Skata and Ma (2003). Lin and Liu (2000)
found that fiscal decentralisation had a positive
impact on China’s growth.Thiessen (2000) found a
positive and direct relationship between decentral-
isation and growth for panels of high income,
Western European and middle-income countries.
Zhang and Zou (1997) found the same for region-
al growth in India.
Negative or inconclusive impacts
Several other studies find that the impact of decen-
tralisation on growth is either negative or inconclu-
sive. Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Xie, Zou and
Davoodi (1999) using various data sets for the
developing countries, developed countries, and
time series data of the US discovered that decen-
tralisation was associated with slower growth.
Zhang and Zou (1998) found that fiscal decentrali-
sation in China contributed to lower provincial
growth.According to Davoodi and Zou (1998) and
Zhang and Zou (1998), the negative association
between fiscal decentralisation and economic
growth may indicate that in practice local govern-
ments may not be responsive to local citizens’ pref-
erences and needs. This can occur when local offi-
cials are not elected by local citizens and when local
citizens may be too poor to “vote with their feet.”
For the case of China, the central government is
constantly constrained by the limited resources for
public investment in national priorities such as
highways, railways, power stations, telecommunica-
tions, and energy. Such key infrastructure projects
may have a far more significant impact on growth
across Chinese provinces than their counterparts in
each province.This finding has some implications for
other developing countries and transitional
economies.The merit of fiscal decentralisation have
to be measured relative to existing revenue and
expenditure assignments and the stage of economic
development. The central government may be in a
much better position to undertake public investment
with nation-wide externalities in the early stage of
economic development. More importantly, if local
shares in total fiscal revenue and expenditure are
already high, according to Zhang and Zou (1998),
further decentralisation may result in slower overall
economic growth. Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire (2003)
found a negative impact of decentralisation on eco-
nomic growth for Mexico and the USA but no
impact for Germany, India, Italy and Spain. Phillips
and Woller (1997) and Matinez-Vazquez and McNab
(2003) could not find a statistically significant rela-
tionship between fiscal decentralisation and eco-
nomic growth for a cross-section of countries.
Conclusions
Decentralisation whereby local governments are
empowered to make all policy and program deci-
sions on behalf of their resident-voters represents a
complex system of political, administrative and fis-
cal autonomy and associated accountability mecha-
nisms to ensure responsiveness and accountability
to voters.While in theory, such a system is expected
to have positive impacts on the efficiency and equi-
ty of public service provision, in practice, these out-
comes depend upon the existing institutional
arrangements (including power relations) and
coherence of decentralisation policies to create the
proper incentive environment for bottom-up
accountability.This explains the myriad of outcomes
that we see in practice. Nevertheless, the empirical
evidence presented here is broadly supportive of a
positive influence of decentralisation policies in
reforming public sector in developing countries.
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